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This paper studies optimal taxation in dynamic economies with increasing returns.
We show that if there exists a stable open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal
rate of tax on capital income in the steady state is negative in order to eliminate the
wedge between the private and the social rate of return to capital. This result also
holds when the government expenditure has a positive eﬀect on production activities of
the private agents. In contrast, if the government takes a feedback strategy and if the
government budget is balanced in every period, then the optimal capital income taxation
rule obtained under the open-loop strategy may be violated. It is, however, shown that
if the government can borrow from the public, the negative capital income tax rule may
be established even under the feedback policy rule.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the seminal contributions by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), numerous authors
have studied optimal taxation by using dynamic general equilibrium models. One of the
central concerns of this literature is the robustness of the Chamley-Judd proposition which
claims that taxing on capital income should be eventually eliminated. This proposition has
been examined in a variety of economic environments and many counterexamples have been
presented.1 Formally speaking, the issue of optimal taxation in dynamic economies can be
formulated as Stackelberg dynamic games in which private agents behave as followers and the
fiscal authority plays the leader’s role. A common feature of existing investigations on the
dynamic optimal taxation is to fucus on the open-loop solutions of the Stackelberg dynamic
games: it is assumed that the government can commit the entire sequence of its strategies.
However, it is known that validity of the zero capital income tax proposition is sensitive to
this assumption as well. As shown by Kemp, Long and Shimomura (1993) and Benhabib
and Rustichini (1996), if the government fails to commit the open-loop policies, the optimal
taxation on capital income may not be zero in the long-run equilibrium even if all of the
markets are perfectly competitive.
This paper studies optimal taxation in dynamic economies with external increasing re-
turns. The main concern of our discussion is to explore the interaction between the market
distortion and the type of policy rule taken by the fiscal authority. Introducing Marshallian
externalities into the representative agent model used by Chamley (1986), we first examine
the standard open-loop policies. It is shown that if there is a feasible and stable open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium, the optimal rate of tax on capital income is negative in the steady-
state. More specifically, under the open-loop policy rule capital should be subsidized in order
to internalize the external eﬀects generated by the social level of capital. The rule of negative
capital income taxation, however, fails to hold, if the government takes the feedback strategy
rather than the open-loop strategy and if the government may not issue interest bearing
bonds. We show this result by using an example that is essentially the same as one explored
by Xie (1997), Lansing (1999) and Long and Shimomura (1999). We also demonstrate that
if the government can issue debt, the negative capital income tax scheme may be established
even in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
1To name a few, the Chamley-Judd proposition may not hold, if financial markets are incomplete (Aiya-
gari 1995); if there are untaxed production factors (Correia 1996), or; if commodity markets are impefectly
competitive (Judd 1999 and Guo and Lansing 1999).
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In addition to the case of Marshallian external increasing returns, we consider the situation
in which increasing returns are also generated by the productive public capital. It is revealed
that regardless of the presence of government bonds, the open-loop strategy always leads
the economy to the steady state in which capital income tax is negative. If the government
employs the feedback strategy and if there is no market for government bonds, then the
optimal rate of capital income tax is not necessarily negative in the steady state. However,
we again show that the negative capital income tax proposition may hold if the government
can issue debt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model.
Section 3 characterizes the open-loop Stacklberg equilibrium and derives the negative capital
income tax proposition. Section 4 considers an example of feedback solution and examines
how the main results obtained under the open-loop policy should be modified. By introducing
productive public investment into the base model, Section 5 re-examines the open-loop as
well as the feedback equilibria. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Base Model
The basic framework of our analysis is the representative agent model used by Chamley
(1986). Under a given sequence of fiscal action of the government, the representative house-
hold selects its optimal consumption and labor supply over an infinite time horizon. The
benevolent government seeks to maximize the household’s welfare by controlling fiscal strate-
gies subject to the optimal reaction of the household as well as to the resource and own
budget constraints.
2.1. Household
The instantaneous felicity of the household depends on consumption, labor supply and
public spending of the government. The objective of the household is to maximize a dis-
counted sum of utilities Z ∞
0
e−ρt [u (c, n) + v (g)] dt, ρ > 0
subject to the flow budget constraint
k˙ = rˆk + wˆn− c, (1)
and the initial holding of capital stock. In the above, c, n k and g respectively denote con-
sumption, labor supply, capital stock and the government spending per capita. In addition, rˆ
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and wˆ denote the after-tax rate of return to capital and the after-tax real wage, respectively.
The instantaneous sub-utility function, u (c, n) , is assumed to satisfy uc > 0, un < 0, ucc < 0
and unn > 0. Similarly, v (g) is increasing and strictly concave in g.2 For simplicity, we assume
that capital does not depreciate.
For analytical convenience, we first consider an instantaneous optimization problem in
which the household maximizes u (c, n) subject to the budget constraint, c = wˆn+m. This
problem yields the following first-order condition:
−uc (c, n)
un (c, n)
= wˆ. (2)
By (2) and the budget constraint, the optimal choices of consumption and labor supply are
expressed as c = c (m, wˆ) and n = n (m, wˆ) . Hence, letting the instantaneous indirect utility
function be u˜ (m, wˆ) = u (c (m, wˆ) , n (m, wˆ)) , the intertemporal optimization problem the
household solves is rewritten as
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [u˜ (m, wˆ) + v (g)] dt
subject to
k˙ = rˆk −m (3)
and the initial condition on k. Denoting the costate variable for k by p, the necessary condi-
tions for an optimum are given by the following:
u˜m (m, wˆ) = p, (4)
p˙ = p (ρ− rˆ) , (5)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtpk = 0. (6)
together with (3) and the given initial level of capital stock.
2.2. Producers and the Market Equilibrium Condition
There are identical producers whose number is normalized to unity. The production
function of each producer is
y = f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯
¢
, (7)
2Additive separability between private activities and the public service, g, is assumed for simplicity. It is
easy to confirm that the main conclusions of this section still hold when the felicity function is specified as a
more general form such that u = u (c, n, g) .
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where y is output and n is labor input. Here, k¯ and n¯ represent externalities associated
with the aggregate levels of capital and labor.3 The production function f is assumed to be
strictly quasi-concave, increasing and homogeneous of degree one in k and n. Although the
external eﬀects could be negative, in this paper we deal with the case of external increasing
returns so that fk¯ > 0 and fn˜ > 0. Given the external eﬀects, the producers maximize their
profits and hence we obtain:
r = fk
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯
¢
, (8)
w = fn
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯
¢
, (9)
where r and w respectively denote the pre-tax rate of return to capital and the pre-tax real
wage.
The equilibrium condition for the product market is
y = c+ k˙ + g. (10)
Since the number of producers is assumed to be one, the consistency condition requires that
k¯ = k and n¯ = n for all t ≥ 0.
2.3. The Government
In the base model, we assume that the government does not issue debt so that its flow
budget should be balanced in every period. The flow constraint of the government budget is
thus given by
g = τkrk + τnwn,
where τk and τn denote the rates of tax on capital and wage income. Notice that since the
government runs a balanced budget, g is a dependent variable rather than a choice variable of
the fiscal authority. Remembering that the production technology satisfies constant returns to
scale from the private perspective and that rˆ = (1− τk) r and wˆ = (1− τn)w, the government
budget constraint is written as
g = f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯
¢
− rˆk − wˆn. (11)
3Specification of production technology in this paper follows Benhabib and Farmer (1994) whose central
concern is to study indeterminacy of equilibrium in the representative agent model of growth with social
increasing returns. It is also to be noted that if we assume that f is homogenous of degree one in k and k¯,
then the model becomes a one-sector endogenous growth setting with labor-leisure choice studied by Pelloni
and Waldmann (1999).
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The government maximizes the discounted sum of indirect utilities of the household by
controlling τk and τn (or rˆ and wˆ). From equation (4), the optimal level of expenditure is
expressed as m = m (p, wˆ) . Thus the indirect utility and the optimal labor supply of the
household may be expressed as h (p, wˆ) = u˜ (m (p, wˆ) , wˆ) and nˆ (p, wˆ) = n (m (p, wˆ) , wˆ) .
Accordingly, in view of (3) and (5), the optimization problem for the government is given by
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [h (p, wˆ) + v (g)] dt
subject to
k˙ = rˆk −m (p, wˆ) ,
p˙ = p (ρ− rˆ) ,
g = f (k, n (p, wˆ) , k, n (p, wˆ))− rˆk − wˆn (p, wˆ) ,
and the transversality condition (6) as well as the initial conditions on k. The control variables
of the government, rˆ and wˆ, should be non-negative. We assume that the government takes
the external eﬀects into account when choosing the optimal levels of rˆ and wˆ.
3 The Open-Loop Policies
In this section we follow the standard approach to the optimal taxation in which a stable
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is assumed to exist. To solve the optimization problem of
the government given above, set up the Hamiltonian function in such a way that
H = h (p, wˆ) + v (f (k, n (p, wˆ) , k, n (p, wˆ))− rˆk − wˆn (p, wˆ))
+λ [rˆk −m (p, wˆ)] + μp (ρ− rˆ) .
The necessary conditions for an optimum are the following:
Hrˆ =
£
λ− v0 (g)
¤
k − μp = 0 for rˆ > 0 (12)
Hwˆ = hwˆ (p, wˆ)−mwˆ − v0 (g) [(fn¯ + fn¯)nwˆ + n− wˆnwˆ]
= 0 for wˆ > 0, (13)
k˙ = rˆk −m (p, wˆ) , (14)
p˙ = p (ρ− rˆ) , (15)
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λ˙ = λ (ρ− rˆ)− v0 (g) (fk + fk¯ − rˆ) , (16)
μ˙ = μrˆ − hp + λmp − v0 (g) [(fn + fn¯)np − wˆnp] , (17)
μ0 = 0, (18)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλk = 0; lim
t→∞
e−ρtμp = 0. (19)
Equation (18) is the transversality condition for the costate variable corresponding to p
whose initial value should be selected by the government.4 Provided that the non-negativity
conditions on rˆ and wˆ are not binding, from (12) and (13) the optimal levels of rˆ and wˆ
can be expressed as functions of p,λ,μ and k. Substituting these optimal levels of rˆ and wˆ
into (14), (15), (16) and (17), we may obtain a complete dynamic system with respect to
π,λ,μ and k. If there is a solution of this system that satisfies the transversality conditions
(18) and (19) as well as the initial condition on capital stock, it represents an open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium. Obviously, without imposing further restrictions on the functional
forms involved in the model, it is diﬃcult to check whether or not there exists a feasible and
stable solution leading to the steady state equilibrium. In fact, Kemp, Long and Shimomura
(1993) demonstrate that in the model of income redistribution by Judd (1985), the open-loop
solution may converge to a limit cycle rather than to a stationary equilibrium.5 In what
follows, as many studies in this literature do, we simply assume that the model has a feasible
and stable solution.
In the steady-state equilibrium p stays constant over time, and hence from (15) it holds
that rˆ = ρ. In view of (16), this means that rˆ = fk+fk¯ holds in the steady state. As a result,
the long-run rate of optimal capital income tax is
τk = −fk¯/fk. (20)
Namely, the optimal capital income tax is negative in the steady state. If there are no
externalities associate with capital (fk¯ = 0), then the optimal taxation for capital income is
4See, for example, Bryson and Ho (1975, pp.56-57) as to the transversality conditions for the costate vari-
ables corresponding to the state variables whose initial values are unspecified. If the government reoptimizes
at some later date, say tˆ, under a given level of ktˆ, then the initial value of μ should satisfy μtˆ = 0. As is well
known, this condition is the source of time inconsistency of the open-loop Stackelberg solution, because the
optimal value of μtˆ for the problem solved at the initial time does not generally satisfy μtˆ = 0.
5 It is, however, to be noted that Judd (1999) claims that the average optimal tax rate on capital income
should be zero during the transition even though the economy does not converge to a steady-state equilibrium.
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zero in the long-run equilibrium. For example, if the production function is specified as
y = kαn1−α
¡
k¯αn¯1−α
¢χ
, χ > 0,
where χ represents the scale factor generated by external eﬀects. In this case, the steady-
state rate of optimal capital income tax is τk = −χα. The result of negative tax on capital
income derived above corresponds to the finding by Judd (1997) who demonstrates that the
optimal capital income tax is negative in the steady state if the commodity market consists
of a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries.6
It is worth emphasizing that the above conclusion does not depend on the assumption
that the government runs a balanced budget in every period. If the government may finance
its deficits by issuing bonds, the flow constraint of the government budget becomes
b˙ = g + rˆa+ wˆn− f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯
¢
, (21)
where b is the stock of government debt per capita and a denotes the per-capita total wealth:
a = k + b. Hence, the budget constraint of the household (3) is replaced with
a˙ = rˆa−m. (22)
In this case, the government can choose the optimal level of g in addition to controlling rˆ
and wˆ.
The Hamiltonian function for the government is
H = h (p, wˆ) + v (g) + λ [rˆa−m (p, wˆ)] + μp (ρ− rˆ) + θ (a− k − b)
+φ [g + rˆa+ wˆn (p, wˆ)− f (k, n (p, wˆ) , k, n (p, wˆ))]
The key first-order conditions that characterize the optimal capital income tax in the steady
state are the following:
Hrˆ = (λ+ φ) a = 0 for rˆ > 0, (23)
Hk = −φ (fk + fk¯)− θ = 0 for k > 0, (24)
Hg = v
0 (g) + φ = 0, (25)
λ˙ = λ (ρ− rˆ)− φrˆ − θ, (26)
6See also Judd (1999). Guo and Lansing (1999) generalize the model examined by Judd (1997) and show
that the optimal capital income could be positive depending on the way how the government levy taxes on
the monopoly profits.
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φ˙ = φρ+ θ. (27)
The steady-state condition, φ˙ = 0 in (27) gives θ = −ρφ. Thus from (24) we obtain fk+fk¯ = ρ.
On the other hand, by use of (23) and θ = −ρφ, λ˙ = 0 in (26) shows that rˆ = ρ holds in the
steady state. Consequently, we find that fk + fk¯ = rˆ in the steady state, which yields the
optimal rate of tax on capital income given by (20).
To sum up, we have shown:
Proposition 1 If the open-loop Stackelberg game defined above has a feasible and stable
solution, then in the presence of positive external eﬀects of capital the optimal rate of capital
income tax is negative in the steady-state equilibrium. This result is robust to whether the
government can issue debt or must run a balanced-budget in every period.
The optimal steady-state condition, fk + fk¯ = rˆ = (1− τk) fk, states that the optimal
rate on capital income should resolve the divergence between the social and the private rate
of return to capital. If capital does not generate any external eﬀect, the social and the private
returns to capital are the same so that the optimal policy is eventually to set the tax rate on
capital to zero. In the presence of externalities, the capital subsidy will establish the golden
rule condition under which the marginal productivity of social level of capital equals to the
time discount rate of the private agents. This is nothing but a Pigou-type tax-subsidy scheme
in our dynamic context.
4 The Feedback Policies
Following the standard approach, we have assumed that the government can commit its
strategy over an entire planning horizon and that such an open-loop policy may have a
feasible and stable solution. Xie (1997), Lansing (1999) and Long and Shimomura (1999)
focus on the special cases where the open-loop policy of the leader cannot control the dynamic
behavior of the costate variables for the followers’ problem. The models they discuss may
produce the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in a tractable manner. In general, the feedback
Stackelberg solution are hard to obtain except for linear quadratic games or for extremely
simple non-linear models. Therefore, the examples presented by those authors are useful to
examine analytically how the main results obtained in the open-loop Stackelberg games will
be modified in the case of feedback equilibrium. In the Appendix to the paper, we generalize
the models used by those authors.
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4.1. The Base Model with Logarithmic Utility .
In what follows, relying on a specific example, we re-examine the optimal capital income
taxation scheme discussed in the previous section under an alternative equilibrium concept.
In so doing, we need the following lemma, which is a generalization of an example shown by
Lansing (1999)7.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the instantaneous utility function of the household is
u (c, n) = log υ (c, n) ,
where υ (c, n) is a homogenous function of c and n. Then the optimal spending m is given
by m = ρk.
Proof. The homogeneity assumption means that
−un (c, n)
uc (c, n)
= −υn (1, n/c)
υc (1, n/c)
= wˆ.
The above gives the relation between c and n in such a way that n = η (wˆ) c. Thus the optimal
levels of consumption and labor supply are respectively given by
c (m, wˆ) =
m
1− wˆη (wˆ) , n (m, wˆ) =
η (wˆ)m
1− wˆη (wˆ) .
As a result, assuming that υ (c, n) is homogenous of degree α (> 0) in c and n, the indirect
sub-utility function becomes
u˜ (m, wˆ) = log υ (1, η (wˆ))− log (1− wˆη (wˆ)) + α logm.
Since the transversality condition for the household’s optimal planning (equation 6) means
that the intetemporal budget constraint after t is
kt =
Z ∞
t
ms exp
µ
−
Z s
t
rˆξdξ
¶
ds. (28)
On the other hand, integration of (5) yields
ps = pt exp
µZ s
t
(ρ− rˆξ) dξ
¶
. (29)
Substituting (29) into (28) and using the first-order condition, ms = α/ps, we obtain:
kt =
α
ρpt
, (30)
7See p.447 in Lansing (1999).
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which establishes mt = ρkt for all t ≥ 0.
As shown above, p depends on k alone so that the initial value of p is uniquely determined
by the initial level of capital in such a way that p0 = α/ρk0. As a result, trnsversality condition
on the open-loop policy (18) fails to hold. This implies that tax policy of the government
cannot directly control the intertemporal decision of the household. It may only control the
household’s intratemporal decision concerning the optimal choices of consumption and labor
supply. Since the household’s optimal choice of mt depends on kt, the optimal policy selected
by the government is time consistent. The optimal levels of c and n are
c =
ρk
1− wˆη (wˆ) , n =
η (wˆ) ρk
1− wˆη (wˆ) . (31)
Furthermore, (5) and (30) imply that the dynamic behavior of capital is
k˙ = k (rˆ − ρ) . (32)
Accordingly, in view of (31), the optimization problem the government solves is as follows:
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [∆ (wˆ) + α log k + v (g)] dt
subject to (32) and
g = f (k,Λ (wˆ) k, k,Λ (wˆ) k)− rˆk − wˆΛ (wˆ) k,
where
∆ (wˆ) = log υ (1, η (wˆ))− log (1− wˆη (wˆ)) + α log ρ, .
Λ (wˆ) =
ρη (w)
1− wˆη (wˆ) .
The optimization problem given above is a standard control problem (a game against the
nature). The Hamiltonian function can be set as
H = ∆ (wˆ) + α log k + v (f (k,Λ (wˆ) k, k,Λ (wˆ) k)− rˆk − wˆΛ (wˆ) k)
+λk (rˆ − ρ) .
The necessary conditions for an optimum are (32) and the following:
Hrˆ =
¡
λ− v0 (g)
¢
k = 0, (33)
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Hwˆ = ∆
0 (wˆ) + v0 (g) k
£
(fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ0 (wˆ)− Λ (wˆ)
¤
= 0, (34)
λ˙ = ρλ− λ (rˆ − ρ)− α
k
− v0 (g) [fk + fk¯ − rˆ + (fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ (wˆ)] , (35)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtkλ = 0. (36)
From (33) and (34) the optimal levels of rˆ and wˆ may be expressed as functions of k and λ.
Substituting those functions into (32) and (35) yields a complete dynamic system of k and λ.
If this system has a stable solution converging to the stationary equilibrium, we may examine
the stead-state conditions in the feedback equilibrium.
In the steady-state equilibrium k stays constant and thus (32) shows that rˆ = ρ holds.
Therefore, noting that (33) yields v0 (g) = λ, the steady-state condition λ˙ = 0 in (34) means
that the following holds in the steady state:
fk + fk¯ − rˆ = ρ−
α
λk
− (fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ (wˆ) .
On the other hand, (35) yields
λk = − ∆
0 (wˆ)
(fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ0 (wˆ)− Λ (wˆ)
.
Therefore, we obtain
fk + fk¯ − rˆ = ρ+
α
∆0 (wˆ)
©
(fn + fn¯ − wˆ)
£
Λ0 (wˆ)− Λ (wˆ)∆ (wˆ)
¤
− Λ (wˆ)
ª
. (37)
It is obvious that, under arbitrarily given utility and production functions that satisfy the
foregoing assumptions, (37) may not ensure that rˆ = fk + fk¯ holds
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Consequently, we have shown:
Proposition 2 If the government takes a feedback strategy and if the government budget is
balanced in every period, then the negative capital income tax rule obtained under the open-
loop strategy does not necessarily hold.
In this example, the government can control the intertemporal consumption planning of
the household (that is, the decision about m) only in an indirect manner. This fact prevents
the government from establishing the golden-rule condition in the steady state equilibrium.
4. 2. Government Bonds
8We may find concrete counterexamples to the condition rˆ = fk + fk¯, if we specify the utility and the
production functions as, for example, υ (c, n) = (cα − nα)1/α and y = kβn1−β
?
k¯βn¯1−β
?χ
.
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When the government can issue debt, the optimal choice of m by the household is m =
ρ (k + b) = ρa. Considering this relation and a˙/a = p˙/p = ρ− rˆ, the optimization problem of
the government in this case is given by
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt [∆ (wˆ) + log a+ v (g)] dt
subject to
a˙ = a (rˆ − ρ) ,
b˙ = g + rˆa+ wˆΛ (wˆ) a− f (k,Λ (wˆ) a, k,Λ (wˆ) a) ,
a = k + b.
The Hamiltonian function for this problem is
H = [∆ (wˆ) + log a+ v (g)] + λa (rˆ − ρ) + θ (a− k − b)
+φ [g + rˆa+ wˆΛ (wˆ) a− f (k,Λ (wˆ) a, k,Λ (wˆ) a)] ,
The first-order conditions for maximization with respect to control variables yield:
Hrˆ = (λ+ φ) a = 0 for rˆ > 0, (38)
Hg = v
0 (g) + φ = 0, (39)
Hk = −θ − φ (fk + fk¯) = 0. (40)
By use of (38), (39), and (40), we find that the dynamic equations of λ and φ are respectively
given by
λ˙ = ρλ− λ (ρ− rˆ)− α
a
− θ − φ [rˆ − (fk + fk¯)− (fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ (wˆ)]
= λrˆ − α
a
− v0 (g) [fk + fk¯ − rˆ + (fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ (wˆ)] , (41)
φ˙ = ρφ+ θ = φ [ρ− (fk + fk¯)] . (42)
Consequently, the steady state conditions a˙ = φ˙ = 0 means that fk + fk¯ = rˆ, so that the
optimal capital income tax in the steady state is τk = −fk¯/fk.
Proposition 3 If the government can issue debt, then the negative capital income tax rule
in the steady state may hold even in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.
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This result corresponds to a proposition in Lansing (1999) who derives the similar result in
the context of Judd’s (1985) model of optimal income redistribution problem. The dynamic
behavior of the costate variable for capital stock given by (41) is the same as (35) in the
model without government debt. However, the presence of government bonds provides an
additional equation (42), which ensures the golden rule condition in the steady state. This
proposition thus demonstrates that the divergence between the time inconsistent, open loop
policy and the time consistent feedback policy may be resolved at least in the steady state
equilibrium, if the policy maker may have additional control methods.
5 Public Capital Formation
So far, we have assumed that the public expenditure has no eﬀect on the private production
activities. In this section, we assume that the government spending has positive eﬀects on
the production activities. Since the private technology exhibits constant returns, introducing
productive government services yields an additional source of social increasing returns. We
first present a brief discussion of the case where public services in the precaution function
are flow. We then examine the model in which the production function involves a stock of
public capital.
5.1. The Open-loop Policies
If the production function involves a flow of public service, it may be specified as
y = f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯, g
¢
, fg > 0. (43)
Hence, even without external eﬀects, the production technology is assumed to exhibit in-
creasing returns to scale in k, n and g.9 First, assume that the government does not borrow
from the public, so that
g = f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯, g
¢
− rˆk − wˆn. (44)
Using k¯ = k and n¯ = n, if (44) has a solution of g, it is expressed as
g = G (k, n, , rˆ, wˆ) ,
9This specification of production technology is close to that of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1993). However,
unlike Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1993), we do not assume that endogenous growth is possible in the long-run
equilibrium.
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where
Gk =
fk + fk¯ − rˆ
1− fg
, Gn =
fn + fn¯ − wˆ
1− fg
, Grˆ = −
k
1− fg
, Gwˆ = −
n
1− fg
.
Here we assume that 0 < fg < 1, and thus, other things being equal, an increase in public
spending enhances the government deficits.10
The Hamiltonian function for the government’s optimization problem now becomes
H = h (p, wˆ) + v [G (k, n (p, wˆ) , rˆ, wˆ)] + λ [rˆk −m (p, wˆ)] + μp (ρ− rˆ) .
From the first-order conditions, we obtain
Hrˆ = v
0 (g)Grˆ + λk − μp = 0, (45)
λ˙ = λ (ρ− rˆ)− v0 (g)Gk. (46)
Hence the steady-state conditions λ˙ = p˙ = 0 imply that
Gk (k, n, rˆ, nˆ) =
fk + fk¯ − rˆ
1− fg
= 0. (47)
This condition yields rˆ = fk + fk¯, so that the optimal rate of tax on capital income is
τk = −fk¯/fk in the steady state.
When g denotes a stock of public capital rather than a flow of public service, the govern-
ment budget constraint presents the dynamic equation of g as follows:11
g˙ = f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯, g
¢
− rˆk − wˆn. (48)
The Hamiltonian function is set as
H = h (p, wˆ) + v (g) + λ [rˆk −m (p, wˆ)] + μp (ρ− rˆ)
+φ
£
f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯, g
¢
− rˆk − wˆn
¤
,
where φ is a costate variable for the public capital. The first-order for an optimum include:
(λ− φ) k − μp = 0 for rˆ. > 0, (49)
10The equilibrium level of g satisfying (44) may not be uniquely determined. For example, if f
?
k, n, k¯, n¯, g
?
=
fˆ
?
k, n, k¯, n¯
?
gη (0 < η < 1) , there are dual values of g that fulfills (44). In this case we assume that the
government selects the higher level of g at which it holds that 1− fg = 1− ηfˆgη−1 > 0.
11The discussion given below presents optimal fiscal policy in growth models with public capital accumulation
studied by, for example, Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) and Zhang (2000).
14
λ˙ = λ (ρ− rˆ)− φ (rˆ − fk − fk¯) , (50)
φ˙ = φ (ρ− fg)− v0 (g) . (51)
Again, the steady state condition rˆ = ρ means that from (50) rˆ = fk + fk¯. Note that
condition (51) gives
fg +
v0 (g)
φ
= ρ = fk + fk¯. (52)
This is the steady-state representation of the non-arbitrage condition between private and
public capital, which states that the social rate of return to the private capital is equal to the
return to the public capital that involves its marginal contribution to the household’s felicity,
v0 (g) /φ.
Proposition 4 If the public spending has a positive eﬀect on the production activities, the
optimum taxation on capital income is negative in the steady state. This conclusion is robust
to whether the public services are flow or they are generated by the stock of public capital.
To sum up, as far as the open-loop equilibrium is concerned, introducing productive public
spending into the base model does not yield an essential change as to the optimal capital
income taxation in the long-run equilibrium.
5.2. The Feedback Policies
In this sub section, we restrict our attention to the model with public capital formation.
First, assume that the government must runs a balanced budget in every period. In the case
of a specific feedback equilibrium discussed in the previous section, the Hamiltonian function
for the government’s optimization problem is given by
H = ∆ (wˆ) + α log k + v (g) + λk (rˆ − ρ)
+φ [f (k,Λ (wˆ) k, k,Λ (wˆ) k, g)− rˆk − wˆΛ (wˆ) k] .
The critical first-order conditions for finding out the optimal capital taxation in the steady
state are the following:
Hrˆ = (λ− φ) k = 0 for rˆ > 0, (53)
Hwˆ = ∆
0 (wˆ) + φ
£
(fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ0 (wˆ)− Λ (wˆ)
¤
k = 0 for wˆ > 0, (54)
λ˙ = λρ− λ (rˆ − ρ)− α
k
− φ [(fk + fk¯ − rˆ) + (fn + fn¯ − wˆ)Λ (wˆ)] . (55)
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Using the steady-state condition, rˆ = ρ, (53), (54) and (55) reveal that in the steady state it
holds that
fk + fk¯ − rˆ = ρ+
α
∆0 (wˆ)
©
(fn + fn¯ − wˆ)
£
Λ0 (wˆ)− Λ (wˆ)∆ (wˆ)
¤
− Λ (wˆ)
ª
.
The above equation is the same as (37) in the model without public capital. Therefore, as
before, the negative capital income tax rule obtained in the open-loop equilibrium is not
necessarily established.
Now suppose that the government may issue debt. The flow budget constraint of the
government becomes
b˙ = I + rˆa+ wˆn− f
¡
k, n, k¯, n¯, g
¢
,
where I = g˙ and a = k+ b. We assume that the investment for public capital is nonnegative.
The Hamiltonian function for the government’s problem may be set as
H = ∆ (wˆ) + α log a+ v (g) + λa (rˆ − ρ)
+φ [I + rˆa+ wˆΛ (wˆ) ρa− f (k,Λ (wˆ) ρa, k,Λ (wˆ) ρa, g)]
+ζI + θ (a− k − b) .
The control variables for the government are rˆ, wˆ and I. The necessary conditions for an
optimum should involve the following:
Hrˆ = a (λ+ φ) = 0 for rˆ > 0, (56)
HI = φ+ ζ = 0 for I > 0, (57)
Hk = −φ (fk + fk¯)− θ = 0, (58)
λ˙ = ρλ− λ (rˆ − ρ)− φ [rˆ + (wˆ − fn − fn¯)Λ (wˆ) ρ]− θ, (59)
φ˙ = ρφ+ θ, (60)
ζ˙ = ρζ + φfg − v0 (g) . (61)
Notice that the steady state condition for φ in (60) is ρφ + θ = 0. Thus, from (58) we find
that rˆ = fk+fk¯. This means that if there is no external eﬀect of private capital, it holds that
rˆ = fk so that τk = 0 in the steady state. In other words, when external increasing returns
are associated only with public capital formation, the public investment should be eventually
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financed by wage income taxation alone. Finally, (56), (57) and ζ˙ = φ˙ = 0 in (60) and (61)
present
fg +
v0 (g)
ζ
= ρ = fk + fk¯..
This is equivalent to the non-arbitrage condition between the private and the public capital
shown by (52) in the case of the open-loop equilibrium.
We may summarize the above discussion:
Proposition 5 If there is a productive public capital and if the government runs a balanced
budget in every period, in the feedback equilibrium the optimal capital income tax rule estab-
lished in the open-loop equilibrium fails to hold. However, if the market for government bond
exists, the optimal capital income taxation in the steady state in the open-loop equilibrium
may hold even if the government takes a feedback strategy.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied optimal taxation in dynamic economies with external increasing re-
turns. We have paid attention to the issue of how the optimal capital taxation changes
according to the presence of market imperfection and to the type of policy rules the fiscal
authority can take. We have shown that when the stable open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
can be established, the optimal rate of tax on capital income is negative in the steady state
in order to internalize external eﬀects generated by the social level of capital stock. This
conclusion also holds when increasing returns are generated by the productive public capital.
In analyzing an example of feedback equilibrium, we have confirmed that the negative capital
income tax rule obtained under the open-loop policies may not hold, if the government does
not issue interest bearing bonds. However, if the market for the government bonds exists,
the negative capital income tax rule is established even under the feedback policy rule.
The main results of this paper suggest that capital income taxation should not be used
unless the source of market distortion is the external eﬀect generated by capital stock. In
other words, the capital income taxation in the steady state should be zero if there are no
externalities associated with the aggregate level of capital. Although such an optimal rule
of capital income taxation may not be held in the feedback equilibrium, introduction of
additional strategies of the government such as issuing debt can establish the proposition. In
this sense, the results derived in this paper would support a rather strong advocate of the
17
zero-capital income taxation claimed by Atkenson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) in the context of
models with perfect markets.12
12See also Chari and Kehoe (1999), Coleman II (2000), and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997).
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Appendix
Xie (1997), Long and Shimomura (1999) and Lansing (1999) deal with a class of Staceklberg-
type diﬀerential games in which the open-loop solutions coincide with the corresponding feed-
back solutions. Although these authors present a variety of examples with diﬀerent economic
implications, the models they examine have a common feature: the trajectories of the costate
variables for the follower’s problem are independent of the control variables of the leader. In
this appendix we develop a general discussion that involves the examples examined by those
studies as special cases.
For expositional simplicity, we assume that both the leader and the follower have the same
state variables and the same dynamic constraints. These simplifications are not essential
for the main results discussed below. First, assume that the follower solves the following
optimization problem:
max
Z ∞
0
u (xt, ct, zt) e
−ρtdt
subject to
x˙t = g (xt, ct, zt) , (A1)
where x is the vector of state variables for the follower, and c and z respectively denote
vectors of control variables of the follower and the leader. The initial value of x is also given
for the follower. In the case of open-loop Stackelberg game, the leader announces the whole
sequence of its control variables, {zt}∞t=0 , which are the functions of time. The follower takes
this sequence as given and selects the optimal strategy, {ct}∞t=0 .
To characterize the optimization conditions for the follower, set up the Hamiltonian func-
tion such that
H (xt, ct,ψt, zt)=u (xt, ct, zt) + ptg (xt, ct, zt) .
The necessary conditions for an optimum are:
uc (xt, ct, zt) + ptgc (xt, ct, zt) = 0, (A2)
p˙t = pt (ρ− gx (xt, ct, zt))− ux (xt, ct, zt) , (A3)
together with (A1) and the transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞
e−ρtptxt = 0, (A4)
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Since (A2) yields ct = c (xt, pt, zt) , the canonical equations for the follower’s problem can be
summarized as
x˙t = g (xt, c (xt, pt, zt) , zt) (A5)
p˙t = pt [ρ− gx (xt, c (xt, pt, zt) , zt)]− ux (xt, c (xt, pt, zt) , zt) (A6)
Now let us define the value function of the follower’s problem:
V (xt, Zt) = max{cs}∞s=t
½Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)u (xs, cs, zs) ds s.t. (A1), xt = given
¾
,
where Zt denotes a given sequence of the leader’s strategies after t, that is, Zt = {zs}∞s=t .
As is well known, when the value function is diﬀerentiable with respect to xt, we obtain
pt = Vx (xt, Zt) . Therefore, the follower’s optimal choice satisfying (A2) may be written as
ct = c (xt, Vx (xt, Zt) , zt) . (A7)
This means that the optimal level of the control variable for the follower depends not only
on the levels of the state variables and the control variables of the leader at t but also on the
entire sequence of the leader’s policy variables after t, {zs}∞s=t . However, if Vx is independent
of Zt, then we obtain ψt = Vx (xt) , so that the costate variable for the follower depends on
the xt alone. As a result, (A5) becomes
ct = c (xt, Vx (xt) , zt) . (A8)
Namely, the optimal value of ct is completely specifies by xt and zt.
If the above holds, denoting the leader’s instantaneous objective function by U (x, c, z) ,
the optimization problem of the leader becomes
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρtU (xt, c (xt, Vx (xt) , zt) , zt) dt
subject to
x˙t = g (xt, c (xt, Vx (xt) , zt) , zt)
and the initial condition on x. Since this problem is a ’game against the nature’, the open-loop
solution for this problem coincides with the feedback solution that satisfies the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation such that
ρV ∗ (xt) = max
zt
{u (xt, c (xt,ψ (xt) , zt) , zt) + V ∗x (xt) g (xt, c (xt,ψ (xt) , zt) , zt)} , (A9)
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where V ∗ (xt) is the value function for the leader’s problem defined by
V ∗ (xt) = max{zs}∞s=t
½Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)U (xt, c (xt, Vx (xt) , zt) , zt) , s.t. (A1 ), xt = given
¾
The resulting optimal choice of zt satisfies
uccz + uz + V
∗
x (xt) (cz + gz) = 0. (A10)
(A8) gives the feedback solution zt = z (xt) in which the leader’s control variables depend
only on the current level of the state variables. Naturally, this solution coincides with the
open loop solution obtained by solving the leader’s problem by use of the maximum principle.
An obvious condition for that Vx is independent of Zt is that V function can be written
as additively separable function between xt and Zt.
V (xt, Zt) = V
1 (xt) + V
2 (Zt) . (A11)
As shown in Lemma 1, the value function of the representative family in our example is
V (kt, {wˆs}∞s=t , {rˆs}∞s=t , {gs}∞s=t) = max
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) [∆ (wˆs) + α log ks + v (gs)] ds,
Noting that the solution of (32) is ks = kt exp
¡R s
t (rˆξ − ρ) dξ
¢
, we find that the value function
is rewritten as
V (kt, {ws}∞t , {rˆs}∞s=t , {gs}∞s=t)
=
α
ρ
log kt +
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
½
α
µZ s
t
(rˆξ − ρ) dξ
¶
+∆ (wˆs) + v (gs)
¾
ds,
so that the separability condition is satisfied.
Similarly, in the models used by Lansing (1999) and Long and Shimomura (1999), x is a
scalar and the followers dynamic equations (A6) and (A7) are written as
x˙t = h (zt)xt − 1/pt,
p˙t = pt (ρ− h (zt)) .
As shown by Lemma 1, the solutions of xt and pt that fulfill the transversality condition,
limt→∞ e−ρtptxt = 0, should satisfy
ptxt = 1/ρ for all t ≥ 0.
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Therefore, the costate variable of the follower is independent of the sequence of zt in every
period. 13 The models examined by Xie (1997) assumes that income is uniformly taxed.
Using our notation, the felicity function of the follower is u =
¡
c1−σt − 1
¢
/ (1− σ) +v (zt)
and the dynamic constraint for the follower is x˙t = h (zt)x
β
t − ct. The canonical equations of
the follower’s problem is
x˙t = h (zt)x
β
t − p
−1/σ
t ,
p˙t = pt
³
ρ− βh (zt)xβ−1t
´
.
It is easy to see that the solution of the above satisfying the transversality condition holds
the relation p1/σt xt = 1/ρ, either if β = σ or if β = 1. (When β = 1, the model is becomes an
”Ak” model and hence the transition process does not exist.), Again, pt depends on xt alone
so that the leader cannot directly control the behavior of pt. Xie’s (1997) examples show that
the assumption of a log utility function of the follower may not be necessary to establish the
case where the future values of the leader’s control variables fail to aﬀect the costate variables
of the follower’s problem.14
13Kemp, Long ans Shimomura (1993) analyze the feedback solution of the model in Judd (1985). A specific
example they use belongs to the calss of models discussed above.
14Mino (2000) presents a more detailed discussion on the conditions under which the solutions in open-loop
Stackelberg diﬀerential games satisfy dynamic consistency.
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